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Novel influenza A viruses and pandemic threats
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A surge in human infections caused by avian influenza A H7N9 virus in China has prompted 
pandemic concerns and has focused attention on novel influenza A viruses.1 Since 2013, 
more than 1400 human beings infected with avian influenza A H7N9 virus, resulting from 
poultry exposures, have been reported during winter– spring epidemics in China.2–4 Low 
pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) A H7N9 viruses have spread silently among 
asymptomatically infected poultry in bird markets and farms. Avian influenza A H7N9 virus 
infection of human beings can cause severe illness, with high mortality (about 40%) in 
hospital inpatients.1–3,5 Since late 2016, more than 600 human infections have been reported 
from eastern, central, and western provinces, indicating that avian influenza A H7N9 virus 
circulation among poultry has expanded.3,6–8 The cumulative number of cases of avian 
influenza A H7N9 virus infection in human beings now exceeds that of infections caused by 
highly pathogenic avian influenza A H5N1 virus, which has circulated among poultry and 
infected people since 1997 (table).3
Avian influenza A H7N9 viruses have evolved substantially in the past year. The 
predominant group of viruses currently circulating among poultry is genetically and 
antigenically different from previous viruses, meaning that stockpiled pre-pandemic 
vaccines are unlikely to provide protection. In February, 2017, highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) A H7N9 virus infections were reported in China, indicating that some 
avian influenza A H7N9 viruses have evolved from LPAI to HPAI.9,10 HPAI A H7N9 virus 
can cause high mortality in poultry and possibly even more severe illness in human beings 
than LPAI A H7N9 virus. Limited human-to-human transmission between family members 
and between unrelated individuals has been reported.2,11 Accounting for available 
virological, epidemiological, and ecological characteristics, avian influenza A H7N9 is 
considered to present the highest risk among all evaluated novel influenza A viruses in terms 
of potential to emerge as a pandemic virus and cause substantial human illness (appendix).12
Given the pandemic potential of avian influenza A H7N9 and other novel influenza A 
viruses, it is vitally important to monitor and characterise these viruses. In the past century, 
all four pandemic influenza viruses were novel influenza A viruses at least partially of avian 
or swine origin. Several other novel influenza A viruses that are antigenically and 
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genetically distinct from seasonal influenza A viruses have also infected human beings 
(table). In the past two decades, the number of reported infections caused by novel influenza 
A viruses has steadily increased, partly due to improved surveillance and diagnostic testing, 
but also due to overcrowding—people, poultry, and pigs have increased opportunities for 
virus infections.13 In some cases, avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection has been exported 
in travellers from mainland China to other countries.14–16
Avian influenza A viruses can be either HPAI, occurring only in a subset of H5 and H7 
viruses, or LPAI, occurring in all subtypes. HPAI viruses are distinguished from LPAI 
viruses by molecular and pathogenicity criteria; in general, HPAI virus infection of poultry 
might cause high mortality rapidly, whereas LPAI virus infection of poultry might be 
asymptomatic or only cause mild disease. LPAI H5 and H7 viruses can evolve into HPAI 
viruses, while viruses with new gene constellations can emerge through genetic 
reassortment. Mild-to-moderate illness, as well as severe and fatal disease, have been 
reported for human beings with LPAI and HPAI virus infections (table). Thus, disease in 
poultry infected by LPAI or HPAI viruses might not correlate with disease severity observed 
in infected human beings.
Pigs are central to the ecology of influenza A viruses because they can be infected with 
human, avian, and swine influenza A viruses and thus are an important host within which 
new viruses can arise through genetic reassortment. The swine-origin 2009 H1N1 pandemic 
virus, now called H1N1pdm09, contained genes from avian, swine, and human influenza A 
viruses.17 Sporadic human infections with swine influenza A viruses (so-called variant 
viruses) can occur through exposure to infected pigs, and outbreaks associated with 
agricultural fairs have occurred in the USA, including 306 human infections in 2012.18 
Although most variant virus infections have occurred in children and cause mild illness, 
severe and fatal outcomes have been reported (table), including reports of critical illness in 
Europe.19,20
Because influenza A viruses evolve within their host species, an important public health 
priority is to strengthen surveillance of influenza A viruses at the animal–human interface, 
particularly in birds and pigs, and among human beings with mild and severe illness 
(appendix). Early detection of novel influenza A viruses to reveal their genetic, antigenic, 
phenotypic, and antiviral resistance characteristics is crucial for pandemic risk assessment 
and to inform development of candidate vaccine viruses, new therapeutics, and new 
diagnostic assays. Comprehensive virus characterisation (virological, structural, antigenic, 
pathogenesis, and transmissibility in animal models) cannot be done only on the basis of 
genetic data, and such characterisation requires ongoing, timely virus sharing worldwide to 
inform public health response. Novel influenza A virus detection and characterisation 
require increased capacity in both animal and public health laboratories worldwide.
The high mortality associated with some avian influenza A virus infections (table) and the 
emergence of neuraminidase inhibitor resistance during treatment in severely ill patients 
with avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection highlight the need to improve clinical 
management of hospital inpatients with influenza virus infections.1,9,21 Emergence of 
neuraminidase inhibitor resistance is particularly concerning because neuraminidase 
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inhibitor antivirals are used to treat patients with influenza virus infections worldwide and 
are stockpiled for pandemic response. Establishment of ongoing, multisite, regional clinical 
research platforms can facilitate randomised trials of interventions—including 
investigational antivirals effective against neuraminidase-inhibitor-resistant viruses, 
immunomodulators, immunotherapeutics, and different strategies for advanced organ 
support—for severely ill patients with influenza virus infection. Integrated analyses of 
prospectively collected clinical and laboratory data (virological monitoring, genetic 
analyses, antiviral resistance assays, biomarker and immunological measurements) can 
facilitate understanding of pathogenesis and monitoring of effectiveness of interventions.
Although the evolving landscape of novel influenza A viruses highlights the need for refined 
public health preparedness and response capabilities, seasonal influenza remains a major 
challenge. Available influenza vaccines have moderate effectiveness; more effective vaccines 
and therapies are needed. Efforts to improve the global influenza virus surveillance capacity, 
rapidly develop high-yielding candidate vaccine viruses and vaccine production processes, 
and expand vaccine manufacturing capacity and vaccine use worldwide will also strengthen 
the global response to novel influenza A virus infections and pandemic influenza. 
Development of next-generation vaccines that stimulate more broadly protective and longer-
lasting immunity would greatly improve public health efforts to control both seasonal and 
pandemic influenza.
Although no evidence exists of sustained human-to-human transmission, avian influenza A 
H7N9 virus is the greatest pandemic threat to date.12 It is impossible to know which virus 
will cause the next influenza pandemic or when or where it will emerge. Nevertheless, 
ongoing preparedness for avian influenza A H7N9 virus includes the development of 
candidate vaccine viruses based on recently emerged fifth epidemic wave viruses9,10 and 
production of vaccines for evaluation in clinical trials and stockpiling. Continued vigilance 
is required to monitor changes in the epidemiology or virological characteristics of avian 
influenza A H7N9 and other novel influenza A viruses that could signal a heightened 
pandemic risk.
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